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ABSTRACT
The growth of supermarkets in southern Africa opens local and
regional markets to suppliers through participation in supermarket
supply chains. Supermarkets in the region provide an important
route to market for processed foods and household consumable
products. Through a regional value chain lens, this article provides
an assessment of the implications of the growth of supermarkets
for the participation of suppliers in Botswana, South Africa, Zambia
and Zimbabwe. The research finds that, while supermarkets
provide important opportunities for suppliers, they also exert
considerable buyer power that limits supplier development and
upgrading. High private standards, onerous requirements and
costly trading terms negatively affect supplier participation in
value chains. Long-term investments are required to build the
capabilities of suppliers to meet supermarket requirements in
terms of quality, consistency, volume and cost-competitiveness.
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1. Introduction
The internationalisation of supermarkets in southern Africa has important consequences
for suppliers of food and household consumable products. Supermarkets are a key and
growing route to market for suppliers and, given their multinational nature in the
region, they open larger regional markets for them (das Nair & Chisoro, 2015, 2016,
2017). This potentially allows suppliers to attain the necessary scale to invest in capabilities
and become competitive in national, regional and even international markets. Supermar-
kets, therefore, can be a catalyst to stimulate food processing and light manufacturing
industries in southern Africa, key objectives of the Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC) Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap, 2015–63. For certain countries
in the region, this can contribute to the development of capabilities to move them from
being exporters of basic commodities to exporters of value-added products, and can
allow for deep-sea import replacement.1 This trigger in industrial development has
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important knock-on effects on intra-regional trade, employment creation, economic
growth and poverty alleviation (Reardon &Weatherspoon, 2003; Reardon & Gulati, 2008).
Supermarkets have transformed food supply chains – from procurement methods and
requirements to negotiation of trading terms and private standards with suppliers
(Reardon et al., 2004; Brown & Sander, 2007; Emongor & Kirsten, 2009). Supermarkets
with market power can exert considerable buyer power in the negotiation of trading
terms, with cost implications for suppliers. This can negatively impact supplier participation
and capabilities development. Suppliers have to upgrade capabilities to obtain shelf space
and remain competitive in terms of cost, quality, consistency and volumes demanded.
Often in the region, it is only a handful of large, dominant suppliers that can do so.
This article explores the implications of the growth of supermarkets for suppliers in the
southern African region, the factors that affect their ability to participate in value chains
and the potential opportunities available to expand regional sales. This is viewed through a
regional value chain (RVC) lens. Building on core concepts of governance, linkages and
upgrading from the global value chain (GVC) literature (Gereffi et al., 2005; Gereffi &
Fernandez-Stark, 2011), an RVC lens is appropriate as it reveals the importance of regional
dynamics and the advantages that regional suppliers have over global suppliers in supply-
ing supermarkets in southern Africa. As highlighted, the development of industrial
capacity in the region is a key priority, and understanding the potential that supermarkets
offer in this regard is important for regional development.
This article draws from in-depth country studies undertaken for UNU-WIDER by das
Nair and Chisoro (2015, 2016, 2017), Ziba and Phiri (2017) and Chigumira et al. (2016).
Section 2 reviews the literature on the interaction between supermarkets and suppliers, the
implications of buyer power, and the changes in procurement practices and requirements
of supermarket chains globally. Section 3 sets out the methodology and highlights the key
findings from the studies. These include the role of supermarkets in driving regional trade
patterns of food and household consumables in Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and Zim-
babwe. The section further assesses the critical success factors, requirements and capabili-
ties needed to supply supermarkets, and evaluates concerns of supermarket buyer power.
Finally, it provides an overview of supplier development programmes of regional super-
market chains. Section 4 concludes by providing policy recommendations for creating
regional suppliers, with supermarkets as key routes to market.
2. The relationship between supermarkets and suppliers
A GVC or an RVC framework allows for an understanding of upgrading opportunities for
suppliers within a value chain. Essentially a bottom-up approach, upgrading looks at strat-
egies used by actors to maintain or improve their positions in the global, or regional,
economy. Upgrading refers to ‘firms, countries or regions moving to higher value activities
in GVCs in order to increase the benefits (e.g. security, profits, value-added, capabilities)
from participating in global production’ (Gereffi, 2005b:171). GVC participation can grant
firms in developing countries the access to social capital and competitive assets that will
allow them to upgrade. Upgrading is not automatic and is very selective, with only the
very best firms being granted the opportunity. Nonetheless, this ‘upgrading’ effect has
been credited with enabling relatively underdeveloped regions to become substantial
exporters within a short space of time (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002).
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Supermarket procurement methods and requirements affect the participation and
upgrading of suppliers in processed food and household consumables value chains in
the region. Globally, supermarkets have moved away from spot purchases2 to the use of
specialised procurement agents or dedicated wholesalers, or direct procurement from
farmers and processors under contract. This gives them direct influence over pricing,
quantities, terms of delivery and product quality. This can have the adverse effect of
shrinking the supply base as a result of using only preferred suppliers (see Altenburg
et al., 2016) and bypassing general wholesalers (Humphrey, 2007). Large supermarket
chains have also shifted away from traditional store-by-store or direct-store delivery pro-
curement and towards distribution centres (DCs) to supply stores (Reardon & Hopkins,
2006; Reardon & Gulati, 2008). DCs have become a key pathway to modern retailing.
Supermarkets further impose private standards that can limit supplier participation
(Boselie et al., 2003). These are over and above the legal standards that suppliers must
adhere to. The capabilities of local suppliers to meet these standards and reach the scale
required to compete with imports are important for their sustainability. Marketing of
fresh produce to supermarkets has been particularly difficult for suppliers in developing
countries as the institutional, physical and financial infrastructural support systems are
weak (including bar coding, packing houses, cold chains, credit facilities, standards, certi-
fications, sanitary and phytosanitary protocols, etc.) (Tschirley, 2010). Suppliers are
usually responsible for all activities until product delivery, and for the costs of private stan-
dards and other supermarket requirements.
The modernisation of supermarkets has therefore placed pressure on suppliers with
regards to costs, volumes supplied, consistency and quality of products (Dakora, 2012;
Basker & Noel, 2013). This can make it difficult for them to integrate into supermarket
value chains and they often require significant investments in capital and technological,
managerial, organisational and financial upgrades to meet requirements. Supermarkets
therefore tend to turn to imports and are more likely to source their products via
imports if they are foreign-owned (Altenburg et al., 2016). As shown in Section 3.1, this
is the case of South African chains in the region that import heavily from South Africa.
A range of region-specific factors have contributed to this, including lower relative trans-
port costs, lower tariffs, trade liberalisation, trade agreements, innovations in communi-
cations and increased capital mobility (Brown & Sander, 2007).
When foreign retailers first enter a host country, they tend to import a larger share of
their supplies from their home base and, over time, increase their share of local sourcing
(Cattaneo, 2013). In southern Africa, an obvious first step to connecting to GVCs is to suc-
cessfully compete in RVCs. The time taken to switch to local supply depends on the
product, the existing level of supplier capacity and capabilities in each country,3 as well
as country-specific institutional and political factors. Foreign supermarkets are most
likely to first source perishable agricultural products locally given the importance of
short cold chains for these. In southern Africa, switching from South African imports
takes longer, especially for products that require significant value-addition, given the
limited processing and manufacturing capabilities in many countries. This is where
2One-time purchases on the open market to meet immediate demand.
3Increased local supply over time may also result from supermarkets becoming better acquainted with local suppliers that
meet the requisite standards.
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opening markets via supermarkets can assist suppliers, requiring a combination of build-
ing capabilities and designing enabling policies for the region.
Over and above demanding lower costs and higher standards, supermarkets often
impose other costs on suppliers through the exertion of buyer power in the negotiation
of trading terms. Within an industrial organisational framework, buyer power has been
defined as
the situation which exists when a firm or a group of firms, either because it has a dominant
position as a purchaser of a product or a service or because it has strategic or leverage advan-
tages as a result of its size or other characteristics, is able to obtain from a supplier more
favourable terms than those available to other buyers. (OECD, 2013:23)
Dobson et al. (1998:5) describe buyer power in a similar way; that is, the case in which ‘a
firm or group of firms obtain from suppliers more favourable terms than those available to
other buyers or would otherwise be expected under normal competitive conditions’.
A GVC approach can complement a traditional industrial organisational framework to
better understand buyer power, governance and distribution of rents at different levels of
the value chain and how these can affect upgrading.
Large supermarket chains control prices paid to suppliers by controlling elements in
trading terms such as listing fees, rebates, advertising and slotting allowances, promotion
fees, payment period terms, settlement discounts and so on (Clarke et al., 2002; Reardon &
Gulati, 2008; Dobson, 2015). Increasing retail concentration and significant barriers to
entry limit the choices suppliers have in terms of distributing their goods in many
countries (Dobson, 2015).
In the supermarket industry, abuse of buyer power can result in the ‘waterbed effect’,
whereby large retailers negotiate with suppliers to secure price reductions that are not
cost-related, and then increase prices to smaller independent grocery retailers to compen-
sate for this (Inderst & Valletti, 2011). While suppliers would want to have as many retai-
lers to sell to as possible, the threat of being de-listed by large supermarkets chains may
result in suppliers giving in to the demands of supermarkets (Dobson, 2015). Market
inquiries are initiated by competition authorities given concerns around buyer power, par-
ticularly because of the exclusionary effects it can have on suppliers and rival retailers.
3. The implications of the spread of supermarkets for suppliers in southern
Africa
3.1 Methodology
The country studies analysed both qualitative and quantitative data from a combination of
primary data from field interviews and secondary data from trade and statistics databases.
A total of 171 field interviews were conducted in Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and
Zimbabwe, with supermarkets, suppliers, wholesalers, independent retailers, industry
associations, competition authorities and government departments (Table 1).
Tailored semi-structured questionnaires were administered to respondents as part of
in-depth interviews. Based on value chain and industrial organisation principles, the ques-
tionnaires were designed to probe the perceptions and experiences of suppliers and other
stakeholders regarding supermarket practices. Similarly, supermarkets were asked about
their requirements and the challenges they faced in procurement. The questionnaire
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included closed and open-ended questions on concentration levels, growth trends, lin-
kages, procurement methods, factors in the supply to supermarkets, investments in
upgrading, concerns around market power and supplier development programmes.
Small, medium and large suppliers within selected sectors were interviewed to under-
stand the respective challenges faced, including millers and bakers, poultry and dairy pro-
ducers and light manufacturers of household consumables, as shown in Table 1. The
studies were limited to selected processed foods and manufactured household products
because these constitute key consumer goods sold in supermarkets and comprise part
of a typical consumer basket. These also have the potential to promote value addition
and industrialisation. This is significant for countries like Zambia, where manufacturing
and agro-processing have been specifically identified as priority areas in the government’s
Industrialisation and Job Creation Strategy for sustainable economic growth and employ-
ment creation.
It is largely the same South African supermarket chains that operate across the region,
although there are also global, other regional and local chains present. South African, other
regional and local chains were interviewed.
3.2 Findings
3.2.1 Role of supermarkets in developing regional supplier capabilities through
increased regional trade
The expansion of supermarkets appears to be driving important changes in the trade of
food and household products within the region, which in turn has implications for the
capabilities of suppliers in the region.
A large proportion of the products on supermarket shelves in Botswana, Zambia and
Zimbabwe continue to be imported from South Africa. However, there are opportunities
for other countries to increase exports to the region and to replace deep-sea imports.
For instance, Zambia shows potential in non-traditional exports (NTEs4), such as
Table 1. Type and number of stakeholders interviewed in Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and
Zimbabwe.
Respondent type
Number of stakeholders interviewed
South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe Botswana Total
Retailers/supermarkets 7 6 2 1 16
Wholesalers, buying groups and distribution agents 8 3 11
Government departments and competition authorities 2 2 1 5
Industry experts, stakeholders and associations 2 3 10 15
Suppliers by sector
Dairy 2 9 1 12
Poultry, eggs and meat 3 7 3 13
Milling and bakery 4 28 1 2 35
Fresh produce and processed food 4 24 28
Soaps and detergents 3 12 1 16
Manufactured beverages and drinks 19 1 20
Total respondents 33 110 17 11 171
Note: Given that many of the South African chains operate in the selected countries, interviews with these chains in South
Africa also provided insights on operations in other countries.
4NTEs refer to all export products that have not been the traditional source of export revenue for the government but have
exhibited rapid export growth rates, including products that have undergone a significant degree of processing.
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cereals,5 beverages, sugar, sugar confectionery, soaps and detergents – products that are
increasingly being sold through supermarkets. Exports of cereals, beverages, soaps and
detergents recorded the fastest compound annual growth rates (CAGR6) of 42, 29 and
25%, respectively, between 2009 and 2015 (TradeMap – Trade Statistics for International
Business Development,7 2015).
This suggests that firms in these sectors are developing capabilities and are competitive
in regional markets. Zambia’s main export trading partners for processed foods are the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zimbabwe and Malawi. However, Zambian
exports still only account for a small proportion of total regional imports, especially
South Africa’s. Hence, there is potential for Zambia to increase exports to meet some of
the regional demand and replace deep-sea imports through access to supermarket net-
works in the region. The DRC, in particular, is a large and growing market for
Zambian products.
Zimbabwe’s economic challenges have negatively affected its agricultural and manufac-
turing sectors, which have failed to meet local demand and thus forced supermarkets to
import. South Africa accounted for the largest and most valuable share of imports in
2015. Although Zimbabwe has limited export potential, an increase in exports was evi-
denced in local industries receiving import protection through tariffs and import bans.
This suggests that these measures have helped to some extent in reviving production
and stimulating exports. These industries include cooking oil, milk and milk products,
baked confectionery and beverages. There has also been growth in exports of vegetables
and fruit (TradeMap, 2015). Zimbabwe’s main export destinations in recent years are
countries within SADC (comprising South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and
Malawi).
Like Zimbabwe and Zambia, Botswana remains a net importer of food and household
products. However, Botswana has export capabilities in beef, making it competitive in
global markets.
Although a large proportion of food and household products in the region continues to
be imported from South Africa, most South African imports of selected food and house-
hold products are from deep-sea markets. Nonetheless, countries like Mozambique, Zim-
babwe, Swaziland and Zambia are growing as sources for South African imports of fruit,
sugar, sugar confectionery and fish (TradeMap, 2015). This signals opportunities for
increased exports from the region to South Africa.
South African exports of processed foods are progressively going to the region, high-
lighting the importance of the region to South African suppliers. South African imports
into the selected countries accounted for the largest share of imports in terms of value
in 2015 (> 80%) (TradeMap, 2015). The rapid growth of South African exports into the
region is closely linked to the supermarket take-off that started in the early 2000s (concur-
ring with past studies that claim that the growth of supermarkets is associated with
increased trade in processed foods; Reardon & Weatherspoon, 2003).
While the trade data highlights products in which there are opportunities to deepen
regional trade, and reduce dependence on deep-sea and South African imports, this
5Cereals under HS Code 10 in TradeMap – Trade Statistics for International Business Development refer to field crops such
as maize or corn, maize seed for sowing, rice, wheat, grain oats, rye and barley.
6Compound annual growth rate (CAGR): average annual growth rate over a specified period of time exceeding one year.
7Hereafter referred to as TradeMap.
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must be considered in the context of country-specific economic and social policy objec-
tives. Despite the countries studied being part of SADC, each country pursues its own pol-
icies to protect and promote its national industries. This affects the participation of
suppliers from the region. This protection takes many forms, including local content
requirements and trade restrictions (das Nair & Chisoro, 2016).
In Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, there are outright bans on imports of poultry,
maize meal and cooking oil, while import duties are levied on a range of other products
to protect local suppliers. These policies are in line with each respective country’s objective
to promote industrial development and beneficiation within its borders. While South
Africa, Botswana and Zambia have ‘softer’ local content requirements for supermarkets,
Zimbabwe’s Competition and Tariff by-laws stipulate that supermarkets are to procure
at least 20% of products locally. However, such initiatives, although in existence,
remain underdeveloped and are small in scale, with the majority of food products still
imported from South Africa and deep-sea sources.
3.2.2 Critical success factors in the supply to supermarkets
The increased trade in supermarket products suggests that certain suppliers are success-
fully meeting supermarket requirements and have upgraded their capabilities. As part
of the questionnaire, suppliers were asked to rank factors that were important in supplying
supermarkets on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not important; 5 = very important. Figure 1
shows the results for each country and on average across countries.
Important factors in supplying supermarkets from the perspective of suppliers include
the ability to supply products at the lowest cost and at the required quality, and to con-
sistently supply the required volumes across all outlets. For franchises, however, smaller
suppliers with limited scale can participate because individual store owners have the dis-
cretion to choose suppliers on the basis of the required volumes for their stores alone.
Acceptable lead times and brand awareness are also considered important. Brand
loyalty is further found to be important amongst low-income customers, particularly in
South Africa and Botswana. Such customers have little disposable income and are less flex-
ible regarding trying new brands, preferring to stick with tried and tested brands. Suppliers
therefore have to invest significantly in building brand awareness and loyalty through
advertising.
Innovation capabilities appear to be relatively less important, although there was a rec-
ognition that innovation, either in product range or packaging, was important to maintain
competitiveness, especially with imports. Other forms of innovation undertaken by sup-
pliers included investments in the quality of existing products and introducing new,
value-added products (e.g. new flavours in yoghurt and milk drinks in the dairy industry,
processed crumbed chicken in the poultry industry and pre-cooked and flavoured maize
meal in the milling industry). In addition, suppliers invested in machinery and equipment
and upgraded logistics supply chains to reduce costs.
The ranking of critical success factors (Figure 1) differed between suppliers and super-
markets (on the 1–5 Likert scale), at least in Zambia and South Africa. However, cost,
quality, consistency and ability to supply requisite volumes were also the key requirements
for supermarkets. Supermarkets generally demanded higher rankings for almost all of the
factors (with some between-country differences). This suggests that information
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asymmetries between supermarkets and suppliers exist, and that suppliers might not be in
tune with what supermarkets are looking for. This calls for greater communication
between supermarkets and suppliers, for instance, regarding why products are rejected




























































































Figure 1. Critical success factors – perspectives of suppliers. Source: Supplier interviews, 2015 and
2016. South Africa N = 11; Botswana: N = 5; Zambia: N = 48; Zimbabwe: N = 15.
Note: Not all of = the suppliers interviewed provided answers for every question. In the case of Zambia, distance to super-
market is used as a proxy for location. Scale: 1 = not important; 5 = very important.
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location of suppliers. This suggests that suppliers can be located in other countries and, if
they meet the critical success factors identified, have the potential to supply supermarkets.
Given the growing capabilities exhibited by certain Zambian suppliers, further analysis
was conducted on the interview data from Zambia. A maximum likelihood Probit model
was employed to empirically evaluate determinants of participation of local suppliers in
Zambia. A range of factors was assessed to see what affected the likelihood of supplying
supermarkets, including size of supplier, foreign ownership, years of operation, accredita-
tion, investment in machinery, barcoded packaging, association membership, manage-
ment experience and distance to supermarkets. These factors were tested against the
null hypothesis that the respective regression coefficients of the explanatory variables
are equal to zero; that is, they do not affect local firms’ participation in supermarket
value chains. The results shown in Table 2 reveal that local firms with barcoded products
are more likely to supply supermarkets in Zambia than those without. Similarly, firms that
invested in new machinery stood a higher chance of supplying supermarkets.
The centralisation of procurement activities through DCs, which supermarkets in the
region are moving towards, also affects supplier participation. While DCs have benefits
for suppliers (reduced queuing times at multiple stores, more efficient use of transport
due to full truck-loads, lower administration costs resulting from single invoicing and
less handling of products), they can also limit the ability of small suppliers that lack the
necessary scale to participate in supermarket supply chains.
In the case of South African supermarkets with a corporate store model in the region,
decisions on suppliers are made at head office in South Africa. Store managers often have
little discretion to select suppliers, although they may provide supplier information to
head office for consideration. Stores under a franchise model however have more flexi-
bility in procurement decisions, making it easier for local suppliers to supply franchises.
However, even for franchises, it is often cheaper to source through DCs given the attractive
cost savings resulting from economies of scale and scope. Supermarkets with DCs are
further able to extract greater discounts from suppliers, including distribution, warehouse
and pallet discounts.
Table 2. Determinants of local supplier participation in supermarket value chains
in Zambia.
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Z p value
Constant −1.966953 1.244205 −1.58 0.114
Turnover 0.0014183 0.0869493 0.02 0.987
Possession of a barcode 1.671103 0.3844063 4.35 0.000*
Improved packaging −0.3833772 0.3736645 −1.03 0.305
Accredited to ZABS −0.1377651 0.4276549 −0.32 0.747
Distance to nearest supermarket −0.0247078 0.0149043 −1.66 0.097**
Foreign ownership −0.0359864 0.3824747 −0.09 0.925
Membership of association 0.127736 0.4105323 0.31 0.756
Number of years of operation 0.0073323 0.0180595 0.41 0.685
CEO’s years of experience −0.0144431 0.0179568 −0.8 0.421
Investment in machinery 1.029162 0.4841402 2.13 0.034**
Number of observations = 74
Wald chi square (10) = 31.22
Prob. > chi square = 0.0005
Pseudo R2 = 0.3482
*5% significance level;
**10% significance level.
Source of data: Interviews with suppliers.
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3.2.3 Legal and private standards
Each country has legal standards that suppliers should adhere to and are enforced by
national bureaus of standards. Food safety, health and safety, environmental, packaging
and labelling standards are also enforced by regulatory bodies.
Over and above these basic legal requirements, supermarkets impose private stan-
dards on suppliers. In South Africa, supermarkets require that suppliers have HACCP
(Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) accreditation, an internationally recog-
nised system for reducing food safety hazards. In Zambia, while HACCP is fully oper-
ational, it is voluntary and implemented only by large companies that can afford it.
Instead, the Zambian Bureau of Standards (ZABS) sets the bare minimum domestic
quality and food safety standards to accommodate local firms struggling to compete
with imports. However, this creates a gap between local and international standards,
making it difficult for Zambian suppliers to compete and gain access to export
markets, including South Africa. In Botswana, HACCP is on the list of standards but
not compulsory. In Zimbabwe, HACCP is compulsory and incorporated in the Stan-
dards Association of Zimbabwe.
In some cases, supermarkets in South Africa seek higher standards than HACCP,
such as FSSC 22000 (Food Safety System Certification), an international accreditation.
In other cases, suppliers are taking it upon themselves to achieve higher accreditations
in order to gain a competitive edge over local rivals and imports. Estimates in South
Africa suggest that HACCP can cost as much as US$5500 and FSSC 22000 can cost
up to $13 800 per annum, with an additional $6900 in annual maintenance fees.8 Super-
markets also impose other private standards, such as sustainability requirements, good
manufacturing practices, minimum chemical and pesticide requirements, organic
systems, barcoding and packaging requirements. Suppliers also have to consider invest-
ing in local and global GAP (good agricultural practice) if they want to export to Euro-
pean supermarkets.
While offering benefits to consumers, the costs of adhering to all these standards are
borne entirely by the supplier, making it increasingly costly to supply formal supermarket
chains. It is not always the case that suppliers are compensated for these additional costs in
terms of higher prices and they still have to compete with cheaper imports. Independent
retailers, on the other hand, often have lower, if any, private standards.
3.2.4 An evaluation of supermarket buyer power in southern Africa
A value chain perspective allows for analyses of governance and market power at different
levels. In certain processed foods and household consumable value chains in the region,
the large supermarket chains have considerable buyer power and dominate negotiations
of trading terms with suppliers. These value chains tend to be buyer-driven, with super-
markets governing and shaping investments and developments within the chain. Since
supermarkets are growing as a route to market to access urban (and increasingly peri-
urban and rural) consumers, suppliers have limited alternatives through which they can
distribute their products. There are only a few supermarket chains that dominate
formal markets in southern Africa. These include Shoprite Checkers, Pick n Pay, SPAR,
8Reserve Bank of South Africa’s exchange rate of 14.427 on 29 August 2016.
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Woolworths, Choppies, Game and Cambridge (Walmart), Food Lover’s Market, OK
Zimbabwe and TM/Pick n Pay JV.
Suppliers, particularly small and medium-sized suppliers, are not always able to secure
attractive trading terms to enable long-term participation in value chains. Over and above
demanding lower costs and higher standards from suppliers, supermarkets often impose a
range of other costs through trading terms. Given that it is largely the same retailers that
operate in most southern African countries, practices across the countries tend to be
similar.
South African supermarket chains typically require suppliers to pay listing or support
fees to be listed on their books. From supermarkets’ perspective, given vigorous compe-
tition for shelf space, payment of listing fees shows suppliers’ commitment to and confi-
dence in their ability to supply the products. Estimates of listing fees in South Africa range
between $350–3500 for a single product line for a limited period (sometimes also quoted
as a percentage off the list price), to as high as $17 000–20 000 for shelves located close to
till positions (near cash registers where customers pay for products).9 In Zimbabwe, esti-
mates range between $10–2500 per product line, $50–100 for the introduction of
additional new product lines and $180–300 per gondola.10 The charging of listing fees
does not appear to be a common practice among non-South African supermarket
chains, but the South African chains have attempted to ‘import’ such practices within
the other countries in which they operate.
Access to good shelf space is critical for suppliers to successfully sell their products. For
new entrants and small suppliers, it is a constant battle to access prime shelf space, which is
usually taken up by multinational suppliers. Similarly, access to cooler/refrigeration space is
important for suppliers of cold products. There have been competition cases have recognised
the harm to competition posed by dominant suppliers imposing exclusivity on cooler
space.11 Recently in South Africa, a settlement was reached in the South African Breweries
Miller/Coca-Cola bottlers merger that included an undertaking to allow small retail outlets
to use 10% of Coca-Cola fridge space to stock competitors’ carbonated soft drinks.
Settlement discounts are also charged by supermarkets for paying the supplier within
the number of days stipulated in the trading terms, which vary depending on the supplier.
In South Africa, it is commonly 15–30 days from statement and the discount for paying
within this period is usually in the range of 2.5–5% off the list price. In Botswana, the
payment period is usually 30 days. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, however, there appears
to be a perception that longer payment periods are the ‘norm’ in South Africa and that
this practice has been imported by South African supermarkets and adopted by local
supermarkets. Long payment periods are a key cause of non-participation of local suppli-
ers in the supermarket value chain. It puts considerable pressure on suppliers’ cash flow
and working capital, which is particularly problematic for smaller suppliers.
9Reserve Bank of South Africa’s exchange rate of 14.43 on 29 August 2016..
10Gondola ends are the exposed short blocks of shelves at the ends of aisles meant to increase sales through intense
advertising.
11European Commission Decision Case COMP/39.116/B-2 Coca-Cola. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39116/39116_258_4.pdf; Competition Commission of Mauritius (2013). Investigation into the
supply of coolers to retailers by Phoenix Beverages Limited and Quality Beverages Limited CCM/INV/019. Available at
http://www.ccm.mu/English/Documents/Investigations/INV019-Final%20Report%20of%20Undertaking-NC.pdf; Compe-
tition Commission of Singapore (2013). ‘Coca-Cola Singapore Beverages changes business practices in local soft drinks
market following enquiry by CCS’, Media release, accessed 21 April 2016).
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Supermarkets sometimes require advertising discounts off the purchase price for adver-
tising on behalf of suppliers when they advertise the supermarket generally. Not all sup-
pliers are required to pay such fees, however, especially those that already heavily invest in
advertising their own brands. Suppliers are sometimes further required to pay supermar-
kets to participate in promotions. Promotion fees can range between $2500–700012 in
South Africa, depending on the scale of the promotion and the size of the outlet. For
large-scale promotions in Zimbabwe, suppliers can pay up to $10 000 for each product
line, allegedly to cover the costs of the supermarket advertising through TV, newspapers
and flyers. Given that suppliers in the region face competition from deep-sea imports, they
often have to absorb these costs, which then result in the squeezing of their margins.
The Competition Authority of Botswana (CAB) undertook an inquiry into the retail
sector in Botswana in 2015/16, evaluating the following potential abuses of buyer power
on the part of supermarkets: threatening de-listing when suppliers do not reduce their
prices or agree to supermarket demands; charging advertising fees, retrospective rebates
and after-sales rebates from manufacturers; delaying payments and demanding wastage
payments. The CAB found that some of these concerns were legitimate and that the
various trading terms typically lowered the price that suppliers could earn by at least
10–15% (see Bagopi et al., 2016). The Competition Commission of South Africa has
also initiated a retail market inquiry looking into issues of buyer power.
Supermarkets can also increase their bargaining power by expanding their range of
own/private label or house brand products. Private label brands are becoming successful
fast-sellers in southern Africa as they compete with branded alternatives on price, value
and quality, particularly for cost-conscious customers.13 Given limited branding and
advertising for these products, prices are often lower than branded products. Private
labels have raised concerns for suppliers of branded products in instances where super-
markets favour private labels on their shelves. They also improve the bargaining position
of supermarkets, putting pressure on the margins of suppliers of branded products.
Every major supermarket chain has a range of its own brand/private label products in
southern Africa. Many suppliers of branded products also manufacture and sell private
labels to supermarkets. While suppliers can use this as a stepping stone to get onto super-
markets’ preferred supplier lists, especially if they have not yet built a brand name, some of
the concerns highlighted above were expressed by manufacturers of private label products
in the interviews. These concerns were most strongly expressed in Botswana, and the CAB
formally investigated the rapid increase in house brands and the impact on suppliers. The
CAB’s inquiry highlighted that house brands increased the buyer power of supermarkets
and this negatively affected the margins of suppliers who supplied both house brands and
branded products. The concern was that retailers in Botswana were pushing the sales of
house brands at the expense of branded products (in terms of better and more visible
shelf space, promotions, advertising, etc.).
3.2.5 Supplier development programmes
The growth of supermarkets, the modernisation of their procurement systems and their
relationship with suppliers has placed considerable pressure on suppliers in the region.
12Reserve Bank of South Africa’s exchange rate of 14.43 on 29 August 2016..
13Supermarkets are also producing private label products that target high income consumers (Ezrachi, 2010).
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Suppliers require a range of capabilities to meet these requirements. Through actively pro-
viding support to suppliers, supermarkets can transfer skills, knowledge and best practices
to them (Altenburg et al., 2016). Some supermarkets in the region have been more proac-
tive in building these capabilities through close partnerships with local suppliers than
others. A non-exhaustive account of these programmes is discussed below.
In South Africa, Woolworths offers considerable support for its South African suppli-
ers. Woolworths typically has long-standing relationships with its exclusive suppliers,
investing in them to achieve the desired quality and standards of their house brands.
As part of the Woolworths Enterprise Development programme, it further supports sup-
pliers to improve empowerment credentials and supports small, medium, black-owned
and black women-owned suppliers. It provides financial assistance (including shorter
payment terms), guaranteed business, mentorship and targeted upskilling.
In 2015 Pick n Pay established its Enterprise and Supplier Development Scheme in
South Africa to assist small suppliers by providing mentorship, guidance and business
development support. This programme provides preferential trading terms to small sup-
pliers with a turnover of less than R3 million over a 12-month period.
In 2015 SPAR put in place procurement policies to create market access for small
business and cooperatives. It initiated a Rural Hub Model in Mopani District in
Limpopo province aimed at empowering local small farmers who struggle with meeting
the required quality, volumes and consistency needed to supply supermarkets, as well
as with meeting local and international standards like local and global GAP.14
Through Freshmark, its fresh produce distribution arm, Shoprite embarked on a three-
year programme (2008–11) to help 200 small-scale farmers meet minimum food safety
and quality standards in South Africa, Swaziland, Namibia and Zambia, including
global GAP and the Freshmark Good Manufacturing Practice standards. The programme
involved training sessions, capacity building, compliance evaluation, provision of technical
support and regular inspections.
In instances where large retailers have been mandated to develop suppliers, there have
been mixed results. Part of the conditions imposed by the Competition Appeal Court of
South Africa in the Walmart/Massmart merger required the merged entity to set up a sup-
plier development fund and make available ZAR 240 million over a five-year period to
develop suppliers. Massmart worked with TechnoServe, a non-profit organisation, to
upskill and train farmers to supply fresh produce to its stores, in addition to providing
preferential finance terms and inputs. This aspect of the initiative was relatively unsuccess-
ful in terms of creating long-term suppliers of fresh produce, highlighting the difficulties of
upgrading capabilities of small-scale subsistence farmers to commercial farmers within a
short space of time. However, Massmart has recently refocused its supplier development
programme away from small-scale farmers and agro-processors to target more mutually-
beneficial projects in DIY and general merchandise with better commercial alignment for
both suppliers and Massmart. There have, however, been some positive outcomes on the
agro-processing side of the programme. One beneficiary, Lethabo Milling, a new entrant
producing maize meal and other products, received a R1.6 million grant from Massmart
for refurbishing its plant. The support extended to an offtake agreement with Massmart
that helped Lethabo secure a loan from a commercial bank. Lethabo has a guaranteed
14Funded by the Dutch government, the Masisizane Fund and the Jobs Fund.
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route to market through supplying Massmart stores and received additional support for
training, waived listing fees, fast-track payments and assistance with pricing models.
In Zambia, suppliers receive limited direct assistance from supermarkets. Supermarkets
in certain cases have, however, relaxed their standards to incorporate local suppliers.
There have nonetheless been two concrete local content initiatives implemented by super-
markets in the last five years: a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between
Shoprite and the Zambia Development Agency aimed at promoting small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) with support from the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Indus-
try; and an MOU signed between Shoprite and the Private Enterprise Programme Zambia
under the Department for International Development programme also supporting SMEs.
Choppies Enterprises, a large retail chain in Botswana, has driven some small-scale
enterprise development by procuring from (and in some cases, advancing cash to)
small farmers in Botswana. In Zimbabwe, supermarkets offer limited support to suppliers.
While such initiatives on the part of the major supermarket chains have yielded some
positive results, these have been limited. Almost all the initiatives involve small-scale
farmers and are of short duration only. The initiatives also appear to be seen as
meeting the obligations of corporate social responsibility rather than as commercially
viable endeavours, although the recent changes in the Massmart supplier development
programme appear to be moving in the latter direction.
4. Conclusions and policy recommendations
This article assessed the implications for suppliers of the spread of supermarkets in
southern Africa. The growth of supermarkets in the region creates opportunities for
food processors and light manufacturers, providing potential to stimulate and revive
these industries. The trade patterns in selected food and household consumable products
revealed the importance of supermarkets in driving regional trade. To create mutually
beneficial trade relationships in the SADC region, however, it is important that South
Africa increases its share of imports from the region and that trade is not so heavily
skewed in one direction (exports from South Africa only). In this regard, opportunities
for greater exports, particularly from Zambia, were identified. Bilateral trade agreements
between national governments could open greater trade opportunities through supermar-
ket networks.
However, there are restrictions to such trade due to local content policies, import duties
and import quotas that serve to protect national industries. Although local content initiat-
ives have not always been strictly enforced and are at different stages of implementation in
the different countries, they are not aligned with an agenda to develop suppliers to regional
markets. If supermarkets are to become a key route to regional markets for suppliers, then
the country-level policies and laws that currently exist need to be harmonised across the
region with a wider view of developing regional value chains. Such policies could be
specific to the supermarket industry, in which, for instance, governments and supermar-
kets jointly determine a proportion of space on supermarket shelves to be allocated to pro-
ducts manufactured within SADC. There are further benefits in harmonising standards
across the region to create greater acceptance of products from outside South Africa.
Opening the region to trade alone is not sufficient to guarantee sustainable supply to
supermarkets. Suppliers also need to continue to invest in building their capabilities to
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ensure they meet supermarket requirements. Limited support appears to be offered by
supermarkets (and governments) to upgrade supplier capabilities. The existing supplier
development initiatives are ad hoc and small in scale and scope. They also do not have
a regional development objective in mind. Successfully developing supplier initiatives
requires a larger, long-term and commercially-oriented approach by supermarkets in part-
nership with governments. This can be achieved through the creation of supplier develop-
ment funds, such as that of the Massmart programme. Fines levied by competition
authorities in relation to abuse of market dominance or cartel infringements in this
sector can be a further source of co-funding.
The research further revealed that supermarket chains in the region have significant
buyer power, the exertion of which is clearly seen in the negotiation of trading terms
and the imposition of private standards. This results in additional costs for suppliers,
thus squeezing their margins and limiting their participation in value chains. The inter-
national experience has shown that codes of conduct or a retail charter between suppliers
and supermarkets are a useful way to control the exertion of buyer power and have been
identified as an effective approach to level the playing field and reduce information asym-
metries between suppliers and supermarkets. This approach has been used in the United
Kingdom, through a Groceries Supply Code of Practice that stipulates that retailers are
required to comply with the Groceries Market Investigation Order of the former Office
of Fair Trading.15 In Ireland, there are plans to institute a mandatory code of conduct
in the grocery sector, to be overseen by the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation.
In Spain, a new act focusing on measures to improve the functioning of the food chain was
promulgated in 2013 using a mixed model of regulation and self-regulation (through
voluntary codes of conduct). In Africa, Namibia is the only country to have a formalised
voluntary retail sector charter.16 Such codes of conduct can be encouraged by national
governments in the other southern African countries, and harmonised across the region
given that it is largely the same retailers that operate in the different countries within
this region.
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